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This paper presents evidence that the demand for costly norm enforcement can be affected by 
the availability of the means for enforcing the norm. Participants in a laboratory experiment 
can reward or punish to enforce a distribution norm. Controlling for the extent of norm 
violation, we find that demand for costly punishment is lower when participants also have the 
opportunity to reward norm adherence. Similarly, demand for costly reward is lower when 
participants can punish norm violations, controlling for the extent of norm adherence. The 
reason is that participants use reward and punishment to signal their approval and disapproval. 
The availability of reward opportunities allows them to signal their disapproval by 
withholding reward. Similarly, the availability of punishment opportunities allows them to 
signal their approval by withholding punishment. This suggests that individuals consider 
reward and punishment to be substitutes. The resultant reduction in costly enforcement does 
not affect adherence to the norm, but has a significant impact on earnings in the experiment. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past decade, experimental economists have gathered extensive evidence showing 
that many individuals are willing to uphold social norms even if this is at a personal material 
cost (see e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009). The willingness to punish 
norm violators and reward norm adherers provides an incentive for others to adhere to norms 
even in anonymous interactions. It can therefore help to improve efficiency by reducing 
negative externalities. For this reason, these findings have attracted considerable attention 
from economists and other social scientists (e.g., Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr, 2005; Guala, 
2011).  
A related question to whether individuals are willing to uphold a norm at a personal cost 
is  how they uphold them. Most studies so far have focused on the demand for costly 
punishment. However, in many instances in daily life, punishment opportunities exist 
simultaneously with reward opportunities. An example of this is online marketplaces, such as 
eBay, which allow traders to leave either positive or negative feedback. Feedback has a 
significant impact on the prices sellers can charge, with positive feedback increasing prices 
and negative feedback decreasing them (Houser and Wooders, 2006). Therefore, positive 
feedback is a form of reward, while negative feedback is a form of punishment for failing to 
provide the anticipated level of satisfaction.  
Reward opportunities do not only allow one to reward those adhering to a norm. They can 
also affect the way in which violators are punished. The reason is that punishment is partly an 
expression of disapproval (e.g., Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Reuben and van Winden, 2008; 
Xiao and Houser, 2005). When reward opportunities exist, disapproval can be expressed by 
withholding rewards – a form of punishment which is less costly for the enforcer. Even if an 
individual decides to use costly punishment, the demand for costly punishment may be lower 
because an investment in costly punishment may signal greater disapproval when the enforcer 
has the option of withholding rewards at no personal cost. Therefore, reward and punishment 
can be substitutes. 
From a social perspective, the question of how individuals uphold norms is arguably as 
important as whether they are willing to uphold them at a personal cost. Punishment can be 
costly for both enforcers and violators; it can destroy social capital (e.g. Fehr and 
Rockenbach, 2003); sever social ties (e.g., Wiessner, 2005; Guala, 2011); trigger counter-
punishment (Denant-Boemont, Masclet and Noussair, 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008), and lead to 
feuds (Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009; Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011; Nikiforakis, 3 
 
Noussair and Wilkening, 2011). Rewards, on the other hand, can have the opposite effects: 
they are beneficial for receivers; they can increase social capital, strengthen social ties and 
lead to gift exchange (e.g. Coleman, 1988). 
Despite the importance of the topic, little is known about how the availability of different 
means for enforcing norms affects norm enforcement and efficiency. In this paper, we present 
the results from a laboratory experiment investigating how individuals use rewards and 
punishments to enforce a distribution norm. We examine the demand for rewards and 
punishments separately and jointly. This allows us to explore whether the existence of reward 
opportunities reduces the demand for costly punishment and vice versa. Withholding 
punishment is a form of costless rewarding. Therefore, the existence of punishment 
opportunities may also reduce the demand for costly rewards.  
To examine whether the availability of different means for upholding norms affects 
demand for costly enforcement, we use a game similar to that introduced in the literature by 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). An individual dictates the division of an endowment between 
herself and a receiver. The norm prescribes that the ‘dictator’ divides the endowment equally 
with the receiver (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Krupka and Weber, 2008). A third player, the 
enforcer, observes the division and must decide whether to use part of his endowment to 
reward or punish the dictator, depending on the experimental treatment. Punishing is costly 
both for the enforcer and for the proposer who receives the punishment. Rewarding is costly 
for the enforcer, but beneficial for the proposer.  
Our main finding is that the availability of multiple means for upholding the norm has a 
pronounced, negative impact on the demand for costly enforcement. In particular, the demand 
for costly punishment is substantially and significantly lower when rewards are possible. A 
similar reduction is observed on the demand for costly rewards when punishment is possible. 
Evidence from a questionnaire indicates that participants use reward and punishment to signal 
their approval and disapproval of the dictator’s transfer. Many of our subjects prefer to signal 
their disapproval or approval in a costless way, by withholding reward or punishment when 
the opportunity exists. This suggests that participants use reward and punishment as 
substitutes. Adherence to the distribution norm is unaffected by the changes in costly 
enforcement, but the availability of different enforcement means has a pronounced effect on 
individual earnings in the experiment. 4 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on norm 
enforcement. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 presents the results from 
the experiment. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
Our study contributes to two separate literatures. The first examines whether costly norm 
enforcement can help uphold norms. The second examines norm enforcement by ‘unaffected’ 
third parties.  
2.1 The demand for reward and punishment 
To date, the focus of most laboratory studies on norm enforcement has been on 
establishing whether individuals are willing to uphold norms at a personal cost and examining 
the conditions under which norms can be successfully upheld (e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011; Gächter 
and Herrmann, 2009). A number of studies have recently provided evidence suggesting that 
the demand for costly punishment may be reduced if they can withhold rewards from norm 
violators, but this evidence, as we will see is inconclusive. While the focus of all these studies 
is on the efficacy of costly enforcement in upholding norms, in this section, we review the 
findings related to our research question.  
Rand et al. (2009) study behavior in an indefinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which 
subjects can cooperate, defect or punish their partner. They find that subjects are more likely 
to respond to a defection by withholding cooperation in future rounds than by using costly 
punishment. Ule, Riedl and Cason (2009) examine participants’ willingness to punish in a 
finitely-repeated, indirect helping game. At the start of each of the 100 periods, subjects are 
assigned the role of either the donor or the recipient and are then randomly matched in pairs. 
In each period, donors observe the recipient’s recent behavior as a donor in past periods and 
must decide whether to “help” the recipient (i.e., increase her earnings), do nothing, or punish 
her (i.e., reduce her earnings). The authors find that subjects prefer to do nothing rather than 
punish. An important feature of both Rand et al. (2009) and Ule et al. (2009) is that, unlike in 
our study, individuals have an incentive to build a good reputation by avoiding the use of 
costly punishment. This may explain, at least partly, the reduced demand for punishment in 
these studies.  
Three further studies examine punishment in conjunction with other means for enforcing 
cooperation in finitely-repeated, public-good games with fixed groups. Rockenbach and 
Milinski (2006) find that the frequency of costly punishment is significantly reduced if a 
separate stage is added at the end of the public-good game allowing individuals to withhold 5 
 
rewards from free riders. However, they also find that the intensity of punishment is higher in 
the presence of reward opportunities. Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007) find that the demand 
for costly punishment is significantly lower in the presence of reward opportunities. And 
similarly, Noussair and Tucker (2005) observe fewer instances of costly punishment when 
costless punishment (both for the enforcer and the norm violator) is available.  
In contrast to these three studies, Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) do not find 
a reduction in the demand for costly punishment in a finitely-repeated, proposer-responder 
game when reward opportunities are introduced. Interestingly, unlike in the previous studies, 
subjects in Andreoni et al. (2003) are randomly rematched in every period. This suggests that 
at least part of the reduction in the demand for costly punishment may be due to strategic 
concerns arising from the fixed composition of groups.  
Understanding the relation between reward and punishment can be difficult when the 
game is played repeatedly, even if individuals are randomly rematched in every period. For 
example, Andreoni et al. (2003) find that the introduction of punishment opportunities 
reduces the demand for costly reward. The authors attribute this to the fact that offers were 
significantly higher in the treatment where both punishment and reward opportunities were 
available. As a result, they argue, an offer that may appear worthy of reward in one 
experimental treatment because of the relatively low offers made by others, may not appear to 
be worthy of a reward in another treatment. Therefore, while repeated-game designs may be 
desirable for studying the efficacy of different means in upholding a norm, a one-shot design 
is better suited for examining the demand for costly enforcement and for addressing our 
research question.
1  
In summary, all of the aforementioned studies suggest that there could be interaction 
effects between punishment and reward opportunities. However, the experiments were not 
designed to address whether and how the existence of reward opportunities affects the 
demand for costly punishment (and vice versa). In particular, the fact that the game is 
repeated a number of times makes it difficult to understand the reason for the interaction 
effect. Studying the demand for costly enforcement in a one-shot environment is also 
                                                 
1 Walker and Halloran (2004) study the demand for costly punishment and rewards in a one-shot public-good 
game. They find that both are equally effective in enforcing cooperation. However, their experimental design 
does not include a treatment with both reward and punishment opportunities. Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2010) 
find that subjects prefer using reward than punishment in a finitely-repeated public good game, even though 
punishment is more effective in encouraging cooperation. 6 
 
interesting because many interactions in daily life where norms govern behavior are one-shot 
(e.g., giving one’s seat on the bus to an elder, respecting a supermarket queue).  
2.2 Third-party enforcement 
A common characteristic of the studies outlined in the previous section is that the 
violation of the norm affects the earnings of the enforcer directly. This is not the case in our 
experiment as we investigate how ‘unaffected’ third-parties uphold norms. Third parties can 
be essential for upholding norms (e.g., Bendor and Swistak, 2001; Ellickson, 1991), as 
violators often act in such a way so that they are not caught by those affected by their actions. 
For example, acts of vandalism or stealing are usually not observed by affected parties, but by 
unaffected bystanders.
2 Studying third-party norm enforcement has the additional advantage 
that demand for reward or punishment should reflect normative standards of behavior (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2004) rather than direct reciprocity.  
To date, there have been only a handful of studies examining how third parties use costly 
punishment to enforce norms (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr, Hoff and Kshetramade, 
2008; Henrich et al. (2006); Marlowe et al. 2008). These studies find that the demand for 
costly punishment increases with the extent of the norm violation. The only study we are 
aware of in which third parties can both reward and punish is Charness, Cobo-Reyes and 
Jimenez (2008). They investigate third-party norm enforcement in a ‘trust game’ in which, in 
some treatments, third parties can punish a selfish responder or reward a trusting sender. 
Therefore, unlike our experiment, punishment and rewards are applied to different 
individuals.  
3. Experimental design 
The experiment uses a three-player game similar to that introduced by Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004). We examine behavior in three treatments which differ only with respect 
to the actions available to the third party (Player C).  
3.1 Treatment PR 
The game in treatment PR is as follows. Player A is given an endowment of 100 ECUs 
(Experimental Currency Units) and must decide how much of it she wishes to transfer, t, to 
Player B,  {0,10,20,...,100} t∈ . Player B has no endowment or any decision to make. The 
                                                 
2 Ellickson (1991, p. 236), for example writes: “In ways that are poorly understood … norms emerge to provide 
the glue that makes possible a surprising degree of order without law. The key to this process is the “altruistic” 
enforcement of norms by uninvolved third parties.” 7 
 
distribution norm prescribes that Player A should transfer half of her endowment to Player B 
receiver (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Krupka and Weber, 2008). Player C receives an 
endowment of 65 ECUs. He can use his endowment to either punish or reward Player A for 
her transfer (hence the name of the treatment). C’s endowment is private information.
3  
In order to punish, Player C must purchase punishment points,  {0,1,...,65} t p ∈ . Each 
punishment point costs Player C 1 ECU and reduces Player A’s earnings by 2 ECUs. In order 
to reward, Player C must purchase reward points, {0,1,...,65} t r ∈ .
4 Reward points cost 1 ECU 
and increase Player A’s earnings by 2 ECUs. Player C can either reward or punish Player A 
for a given transfer, therefore if  t r  > 0 then  t p = 0 for a given t, and vice versa.
 The earnings 
of player A are given by: 
  100 2( )
A
tt tr p π =− +−.         ( 1 )    
Player B’s earnings are given by: 
 
B t π = .            ( 2 )  
Player C’s earnings are given by: 
65 ( )
C
tt p r π =− +.          ( 3 )  
Note that it is possible that Player A could have negative earnings, in which case money was 
deducted from the $5 show-up fee subjects received.  
Equations (1) and (2) are common knowledge amongst participants as are the 
implications of reward and punishment for Players A and C, and the fact that the game is 
played only once. If all individuals are maximizing their own earnings and this is common 
knowledge, the trembling-hand-perfect Nash equilibrium is that Player C neither rewards nor 
punishes Player A who transfers zero to Player B.  
Player C made his decision using the strategy method. This means that Player C had to 
state whether he would like to reward or punish Player A for each possible level of transfer 
                                                 
3 In Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) it was common knowledge that Player C was given 50 ECU. An endowment of 
50 ECU implies that, unless Player A gives more than 50 ECU to Player B, A will earn more than Player C. 
Rewarding thus would increase the earnings difference between A and C while punishing would reduce it. The 
information about C’s endowment was kept private in our experiment in order to preserve the distribution norm 
of transferring 50 ECU (McDonald, Nikiforakis, Olekalns and Sibly, 2009).  
4 The experimental instructions were adapted from FF (2004) and use neutral language. Punishment points were 
referred to as subtraction points and reward points as addition points. The instructions can be downloaded from 
http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/nnikiforakis.   8 
 
and before finding out what A’s transfer was. The responses were incentive compatible as 
Player C would pay for any points assigned for the transfer level Player A actually chose.  
There are three reasons for using the strategy method. First, it allows us to collect more 
data per individual thus helping us to better understand the motivation behind individual 
decisions. Second, it guarantees that we will be able to compare the enforcement decisions 
across treatments even if the decisions of those assigned the role of Player A differ. Third, 
using the strategy method allows us to compare our results with those reported in previous 
studies using the third-party punishment game.
5  
3.2 Treatment P 
Treatment P is our baseline treatment. The game is identical to that played in treatment 
PR with one difference. Similar to previous experiments on third-party enforcement, in 
treatment P, Player C could only punish Player A but not reward her. To keep decision costs 
equal to those in treatment PR, Player C was asked to enter the number of punishment points 
he wished to assign into a first box and then was asked to confirm his decision by typing the 
same number into a second box, for each of the eleven transfer levels.  
3.3 Treatment R 
The R treatment is the same as the P treatment except that Player C can only reward 
Player A but not punish her. As in treatment P, Player C was asked to enter the number of 
reward points they wished to assign into a first box and then was asked to confirm this 
decision. Table 1 summarizes our experimental design.  
3.4 Subject pool and procedures 
A total of 327 individuals took part in the experiment. All participants were students at 
the University of Melbourne with different academic backgrounds (excluding students from 
psychology or those that had completed their first year in economics). Subjects were recruited 
through a database of more than 2,500 using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each individual 
participated in only one treatment. Participants had not previously participated in an 
experiment involving the study of norms or norm enforcement.  
The experiment was conducted in two ‘waves’. 222 subjects participated in the first wave 
of the experiment. Since the rate of norm enforcement was lower than anticipated, we decided 
to run a second wave in which 105 subjects participated. The second wave also allowed us to 
                                                 
5 Brandts and Charness (2011) present a survey of the existing evidence on the impact of the strategy method. 
They report that the treatment effects obtained when using the strategy method are consistent with those obtained 
when using the direct-response method.  9 
 
include additional questions in the post-experiment questionnaire about how participants 
assigned punishment/reward points according to their level of disapproval/approval. We also 
decided to have both Player B and C make enforcement decisions in the second wave. In 
particular, all individuals not assigned the role of Player A used the strategy method to decide 
how many points they would assign to Player A if they were allocated the role of Player C. It 
was common knowledge that Player Cs would be randomly chosen after all participants made 
their decisions. This change does not affect the theoretical predictions. We also aimed to 
collect the same number of observations for each treatment in each wave. In our analysis, we 
control for the procedure used to elicit the decisions by Player C. Our results regarding 
treatment effects are unaffected by this change in procedures.  
The experiment was conducted at the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the 
University of Melbourne using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The smallest session had 12 
subjects participating, while the six largest sessions had 30 subjects participating. Upon 
arrival at the laboratory, subjects were seated in partitioned cubicles and were randomly 
divided into groups – group composition was not revealed to subjects. At the same time, 
subjects were randomly allocated the role of either Player A, B or C and received player-
specific instructions.
6 The instructions included control questions to ensure that all subjects 
understood the game. Before the experiment began, the experimenter read a summary of the 
instructions. After the experiment ended, subjects answered a short questionnaire that 
included sociodemographic questions and asked how they made their decisions in the 
experiment.  
Sessions lasted, on average, 40 minutes including instruction time. On average, 
participants earned 23.20 Australian Dollars including a $5 show-up fee. The exchange rate 
between ECU and the Australian Dollar was 1 ECU = 35 Australian cents. This meant that the 
stakes were not trivial as Player A’s endowment was $35 and C’s endowment was $22.75 
Australian Dollars. At the time of the experiment, the minimum hourly wage in Australia was 
$14.31. The exchange rate between Australian and U.S. Dollar was approximately one.  
 
 
                                                 
6 In the second wave, all participants not assigned the role of Player A received a set of instructions that 
explained the roles of Player B and C. These participants were asked to make the decision of Player C using the 
strategy method and were then randomly allocated the role of either Player B or Player C at the end of the 
experiment. As mentioned above, all information was common knowledge between participants except the exact 
endowment of Player C.  10 
 
3.5 Hypotheses 
As mentioned in section 3.1, assuming that it is common knowledge amongst participants 
that each player is maximizing his/her earnings, the trembling-hand-perfect Nash equilibrium 
is that Player C will neither punish nor reward A, and that Player A will make a zero transfer 
to B. The prediction is the same across treatments. This assumption, however, seems 
unrealistic and the Nash equilibrium under this assumption is a poor predictor of behavior in 
the third-party enforcement game.  
As a guide for analyzing the experimental data, we offer two hypotheses, which are based 
on the following three assumptions. First, individuals prefer higher earnings than lower 
earnings, all else equal. Second, a distribution norm exists in our game. Third, individuals like 
to signal their disapproval to norm violators and their approval to those adhering to the norm 
(e.g., Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Reuben and van Winden, 2008; Xiao and Houser, 2005).  
Hypothesis 1:  The lower transfers are relative to the distribution norm, the greater the 
demand for costly punishment will be. There will be less demand for costly punishment in PR 
than in P.  
The first part of the hypothesis is derived from the second and third assumption, and is 
consistent with previous evidence from third-party enforcement game (e.g. Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004). The second part of the hypothesis is based on our first and third 
assumptions. The rationale is that when reward opportunities exist, individuals can signal 
their disapproval without incurring a cost by withholding rewards. Therefore a punishment p 
reflects stronger disapproval in treatment PR than in P. Controlling for the level of transfer, 
third parties are thus expected to demand less costly punishment when reward opportunities 
exist.  
Hypothesis 2: The higher transfers are relative to the distribution norm, the greater the 
demand for costly rewards will be. There will be less demand for costly rewards in PR than in 
R. 
The first part of the hypothesis is based on the assumption that rewarding increases with 
adherence to the norm. We expect that individuals may reward transfers that are even higher 
than the distribution norm. The second part of the hypothesis is again based on our first and 
third assumptions. In particular, when punishment opportunities exist individuals can signal 
their approval without incurring a cost by withholding punishment. Therefore, a reward r 
reflects stronger approval in treatment PR than in R. Controlling for the level of transfer, third 11 
 
parties are therefore expected to demand less costly rewards when punishment opportunities 
exist.  
4. Results 
The analysis of the experimental data is divided into four sections. In the first two 
sections, we present the evidence concerning the demand for costly punishment and reward, 
respectively. In the third section, we provide evidence in support of the assumption that costly 
punishment and reward are used to express disapproval and approval, while in the fourth 
section we explore how the availability of means for norm enforcement affects norm 
adherence and earnings in the experiment.   
4.1 The demand for costly punishment  
Figure 1 presents the demand for costly punishment as a function of Player A’s transfer. 
As in previous experiments, we find that as transfers to Player B increase, third parties 
purchase fewer punishment points in both treatments. While transfers above 50 ECUs receive 
small amounts of punishment, something also observed in previous experiments (e.g., Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2004), the behavior of participants in our experiment is consistent with 
existing evidence that the distribution norm prescribes that Player A shares his endowment 
equally with Player C because the punishment of transfers greater than 40 ECUs is not 
significantly different from zero in both treatments. This can be seen in Table A1 in the 
appendix. 
The most striking finding in Figure 1, however, is the substantial reduction in the demand 
for costly punishment in the PR treatment relative to the P treatment. On average, subjects 
assigned 3.13 punishment points in treatment P and 1.80 in PR, a reduction of 42.5 percent. 
The difference is statistically significant using the average number of points assigned by an 
individual across transfers as an independent observation (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed; p-value 
= 0.03).  
Table 2 presents a regression analysis of costly punishment. The dependent variable is the 
number of points individual i assigned for a transfer t, pit. Given the patterns observed in 
Figure 1 punishment is modelled as a linear function of transfers. The regression also includes 
a treatment dummy (PR) and a control for whether the observations are taken from the first or 
second experimental wave. Further, given that each Player C makes 11 decisions, we include 
random effects at the individual level.  
The coefficients for the constant in (1) and (2) indicate that Player C assigned 5.28 
punishment points to Player A in treatment P and 1.73 points in treatment PR for a transfer of 12 
 
zero. The Transfer coefficients in (1) and (2) estimate the change in the demand for costly 
punishment by third parties when Player A transfers 10 more ECUs to Player B in treatments 
P and PR, respectively. The Transfer coefficient estimates from (1) and (2) are significant and 
negative, as expected, indicating that an increase in the amount transferred by Player A 
reduced the punishment from third parties. The reduction is smaller in PR than in P, which is 
also to be expected given the smaller size of the constant in PR. The difference in slopes is 
significant as can be seen by the significant, positive coefficient of PR*Transfer in column 
(3). The negative, significant coefficient for PR in column (3) provides additional evidence 
for the significant reduction in the demand for costly punishment. Therefore, we cannot reject 
Hypothesis 1.
7  
What causes the reduction in the demand for costly punishment? Is it that fewer people 
assign punishment points when reward opportunities exist, is it that people assign fewer 
points, or is it both?
8 In treatment P, 59 percent of subjects punished at least one transfer (29 
out of 49), while in treatment PR only 37 percent of subjects did the same (18 out of 49). 
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 2 disaggregate the demand for costly punishment using a hurdle 
model. The likelihood of punishment is modelled separately from the severity of punishment 
conditional on punishment occurring (for details see Nikiforakis, 2008). As can be seen in 
column (4), an increase in the transfer by Player A reduces significantly the probability that 
he will be punished. The probability of punishment is significantly lower in treatment PR. 
While the amount of points assigned is smaller in PR (column 5), the reduction is far from 
being significant. We therefore conclude: 
Result 1: Controlling for the level of norm violation, the demand for costly punishment is 
42.5 percent lower when reward opportunities exist. This difference is significant and is 
driven by the reduced number of individuals punishing when reward opportunities exist.  
 
                                                 
7 The Wave coefficient is similar in both P and PR. This suggests that there was more punishment on average in 
the second wave of experiments than the first. While this may be interesting result worthy of further 
investigation, for our purposes what is most important is that when an interaction variable PR*WAVE is included 
in the regressions, we find that it is insignificant (p-value=0.90). Thus, our treatment effects are unaffected by 
this parameter. We also tried including additional socio-demographic characteristics in regression (3) to check 
the robustness of our results. When Age, Economics [major] and Gender variables are included in the estimation, 
our results are unaffected.  
8  Some readers may wonder whether the reduced demand for costly punishment of a given transfer could be due 
to certain subjects switching from punishing to rewarding. This is not the case, however, as can be easily seen by 
examining the demand for punishing transfers of zero in Figure 1. Such transfers are almost never rewarded.  13 
 
4.2 The demand for costly reward 
Figure 2 presents the demand for costly reward as a function of Player A’s transfer. The 
figure illustrates that, in line with Hypothesis 2, individuals purchase more reward points as 
transfers to Player B increase in both treatments. Transfers of less than 20 ECUs receive small 
rewards, but as can be seen in Table A1 in the appendix, rewards are not significantly 
different from zero for transfers less than 30 ECUs in R and less than 50 ECUs in PR.  
Figure 2 also shows that, in line with Hypothesis 2, the demand for costly reward in 
treatment PR appears to be reduced relative to that in treatment P. On average, subjects 
assigned 3.81 reward points in PR and 4.95 in R, a reduction of 23 percent. The difference is 
statistically significant using the average number of points assigned by an individual across 
transfers as an independent observation (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed; p-value = 0.03).  
Table 3 presents a regression analysis of costly reward, similar to that for punishment 
which was presented in the previous section. The dependent variable is the number of reward 
points individual i assigned for a transfer t, rit. Reward is modelled as a linear function of 
transfers. We also include a treatment dummy (PR) in column (3) and a control for whether 
the observations are taken from the first or second experimental wave. Given that each Player 
C makes 11 decisions, we include random effects at the individual level.  
The Transfer coefficients in columns (1) and (2) capture the change in the demand for 
costly reward as Player A transfers 10 more ECUs to Player B in treatments R and PR, 
respectively. The Transfer coefficient estimates in columns (1) and (2) are significant and 
positive as expected, indicating that an increase in the transfer by Player A increased the 
reward received, in both treatments. The insignificant constants in the same regressions 
indicate that a transfer of zero was not significantly rewarded. The negative, significant 
coefficient for PR*Transfer in column (3) indicates that the demand for costly reward is lower 
in treatment PR. We therefore conclude that we cannot reject Hypothesis 2.
9  
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 3 present the results from the hurdle model for rewards. In 
treatment R, 70 percent of subjects rewarded at least one transfer (32 out of 46). In contrast, in 
treatment PR, only 45 percent of the subjects rewarded once or more times (22 out of 49). The 
negative, significant coefficient of PR in column (4) and the insignificant coefficient of PR in 
                                                 
9 The Wave variable is insignificant as can be seen in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3. This indicates that the 
demand for reward was the same in both waves of the experiment. When an interaction variable PR*WAVE is 
included in the regressions it is insignificant for all treatments (p-value>0.5). We also tested the robustness of 
our result by controlling for different socio-demographic characteristics. Controlling for Age, Economics [major] 
and Gender does not affect our results. 14 
 
column (5) indicate that the reduction in the demand for costly reward is due to a reduction in 
the number of individuals who are willing to reward and not due to a reduction in the size of 
the reward. We therefore conclude:  
Result 2: Controlling for the level of norm adherence, the demand for costly reward is 23 
percent lower when reward opportunities exist. This difference is significant and is driven by 
the reduced number of individuals rewarding when punishment opportunities exist.  
4.3 Costly enforcement as a signal of approval and disapproval 
Why does the introduction of reward opportunities reduce the demand for costly 
punishment? Why does the existence of punishment opportunities reduce the demand for 
costly reward? A critical assumption underlying Hypotheses 1 and 2 is that individuals use 
costly enforcement to signal their approval or disapproval. The results in sections 4.1 and 4.2 
and our inability to reject hypotheses 1 and 2 provide indirect support for this assumption. In 
this section, we present evidence providing direct support for this assumption.  
In the post-experiment questionnaire in the second wave of experiments, subjects in 
treatments P and PR (48 in total) were asked to nominate how many punishment points they 
would assign to Player A if they strongly disapproved of Player A’s transfer to Player B. 
Similarly, subjects in treatments R and PR (46 in total) were asked how many reward points 
they would assign if they strongly approved of Player A’s transfer. If costly enforcement is 
used to signal approval/disapproval we would expect to see a positive correlation between 
subjects’ responses and the number of points they assigned in the experiment. 
Figure 3 plots the number of punishment points assigned in the experiment by Player C to 
Player A, when the latter transferred nothing to B, against the number of points Player C said 
she would assign if she strongly disapproved of A’s transfer to B. Figure 4 plots the number 
of reward points assigned by Player C in the experiment if A transferred 100 ECU to B, 
against the number of points C said she would assign to signal strong approval.  
As can be seen in figures 3 and 4, there is a clear positive correlation between the plotted 
variables (p-value<0.01, for all cases). This evidence supports the assumption that individuals 
use punishments to signal disapproval for violating the norm and rewards to signal approval 
for adhering to the norm. The availability of reward (punishment) opportunities allows 
individuals to signal their disapproval (approval) by not rewarding (punishing) rather than by 
demanding costly punishment.  15 
 
Result 3: The number of enforcement points assigned in the experiment is highly and 
positively correlated with the number of points participants stated they would assign, if they 
strongly approved/disapproved of a transfer by Player A. 
4.4 Norm adherence and earnings 
Player A’s average transfer was 13 ECUs in treatment P, 15.7 ECUs in treatment R, and 
17.3 ECUs in treatment PR. Nevertheless, using the transfer of each Player A as an 
independent observation, we find that none of the pairwise comparisons is statistically 
significant (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value>0.22).  
The level of norm adherence in our experiment is slightly lower than that reported in 
previous experiments (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). However, given the levels of 
enforcement observed, the optimal strategy for a selfish Player A is to transfer zero in all 
treatments. The fact that the demand for costly enforcement is significantly affected by the 
availability of means to enforce the distribution norm, together with the fact that norm 
adherence is unaffected by our treatments, raises the question of how earnings – a measure of 
efficiency – differ across treatments.  
Individual earnings are highest in treatment R, followed by treatment PR and treatment P. 
On average, individuals earned 55.5 ECU in R, 53.7 ECU in PR and 46.4 ECU in P. Using the 
average earnings in a group as an independent observation, we find that earnings in PR are 
significantly higher than they are in P (Mann-Whitney, two-sided, p-value<0.01) and 
significantly lower than they are in R (Mann-Whitney, two-sided, p-value=0.03). However, 
the actual earnings can be misleading as participants assigned the role of Player A could have 
been matched with a different Player C, which could have led to substantially different 
earnings.  
In order to get a better idea of how earnings differ across treatments, we calculated the 
average change in the earnings of a Player A given his transfer and the average 
reduction/increase for that level of transfer in the treatment. The average change in earnings 
given the distribution of transfers was - 15.60 in P, - 4.08 in PR and + 3.30 in R. This implies 
that while the introduction of reward opportunities increases earnings in our experiment, the 
introduction of punishment opportunities reduces earnings.  
Result 4: Transfers are not significantly different across treatments. However, there is a 
significant difference in earnings, with earnings being highest in treatment R, followed by PR 
and then P. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we studied the demand for costly norm enforcement by ‘unaffected’ third 
parties. Our experimental results indicate that third parties use both reward and punishment to 
uphold the distribution norm that exists in our game, but that there is a strong interaction 
between the demand for costly reward and punishment. In particular, we find that the demand 
for costly punishment is greatly reduced when reward opportunities exist. We also observe 
that the demand for costly reward is reduced in the presence of punishment opportunities. 
Our study contributes to a small, but growing literature investigating how individuals use 
different means to enforce norms such as those for cooperation and equality. While previous 
studies have reported that reward opportunities tend to reduce the demand for costly 
punishment, the experimental designs employed prevented researchers from positively 
identifying the cause behind the effect. Our results suggest that the reduction in the demand 
for costly enforcement is due to the fact that punishment is used as a signal of disapproval. In 
particular, reward opportunities allow individuals to express it in a costless manner, by 
withholding rewards. Similarly, punishment opportunities allow individuals to signal their 
approval by withholding punishment. These findings imply that participants perceive 
punishment and reward to be substitutes. Given the well-documented, negative welfare 
implications of punishment, this finding can have significant implications for the design of 
optimal incentives to support cooperation in both formal and informal relations. 
Our study also contributes to a recent discussion about the relative infrequency with 
which costly punishment is observed outside the laboratory (Guala, 2011). Previous studies 
have identified some factors that may influence negatively the willingness to use costly 
punishment such as the risk of counter-punishment (e.g., Denant-Boermont et al., 2007; 
Nikiforakis, 2008) and the preference of some individuals to avoid inflicting harm on norm 
violators (e.g. Masclet et al., 2003; Noussair and Tucker, 2005). Given that reward and 
punishment opportunities coexist in many instances outside the laboratory, our study suggests 
another factor which may limit the demand for costly enforcement outside the laboratory. 
Returning to the example used in the introduction, online marketplaces, Dellarocas and 
Woods (2008) find that many disappointed buyers on eBay prefer not to leave positive 
feedback rather than to leave negative feedback. While this could partly be due to traders 
anticipating that negative feedback will be reciprocated (Li, 2010), our results suggest another 
possible explanation. Disappointed traders would be more likely to leave negative feedback, if 17 
 
the option of leaving positive feedback did not exist. The reason is that withholding positive 
feedback is a less costly form of punishment.  
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Figure 1 – The demand for costly punishment  
 
Figure 2 – The demand for costly reward 
 
The figures do not include observations from three subjects. The subjects are included in the statistical analysis, but are 
excluded here to offer a more accurate representation of behavior in the experiment. The responses of these subjects to a post-
experiment questionnaire suggest that they were confused. In particular, subject 445 assigned on average 33.33 reward points 
for transfers between 0 and 20, and 16.25 reward points for transfers between 30 and 100. Subject 462 rewarded both low and 




































































Figure 3 – Does punishment signal disapproval? 
 
 


















































































































































Reward points that participant would assign if s/he strongly approved transfer
Graphs by Treatment22 
 
 
Table 1 - Experimental Design 
Treatment Punishment  Reward  # of participants 
PR Yes  Yes  111 
P Yes  No  111 




Table 2 – The Demand for Costly Punishment  





   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Transfer  -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.05***  -0.28*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.03) 
PR     -3.64***  -1.39**  -2.26 
     (0.95)  (0.54)  (2.70) 
PR * Transfer     0.05***  0.00  0.05 
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
Wave  1.91 1.84*  1.88**  1.26** 2.19 
  (1.19) (1.07) (0.80) (0.51)  (2.45) 
Constant 5.28*** 1.73 5.33***  -1.64*  14.80*** 
   (1.91) (1.72) (1.36) (0.86)  (4.27) 
Observations 539  539  1078  1078  191 
No of subjects  49  49  98  98  46 
(1) – (3) and (5) are linear regressions and the dependent variable is the number of points Player C assigned to Player A; (4) 
is a probit regression and the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if Player C punished A for a transfer t and 0 otherwise; in 
(5) the dependent variable is truncated at zero; all regressions include individual random effects; observations from three 
individuals are dropped in regression (5) as they were outliers, however, adding them in the analysis does not affect 
qualitatively our results; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 23 
 
Table 3 – The Demand for Costly Reward  





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Transfer  0.11*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.23*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
PR   0.58 -1.88**  4.69
     (1.52)  (0.89)  (3.01) 
PR * Transfer     -0.03***  -0.00  -0.04 
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Wave  -0.08 1.06 0.51 0.85 -0.41 
  (1.82) (2.16) (1.41) (0.75) (2.34) 
Constant  -0.48 -1.58 -1.34  -4.88***  -5.39 
  (2.87) (3.42) (2.36) (1.26) (3.87) 
Observations  506  539 1045  1045 331 
No of subjects  46  49 95 95 51
 (1) – (3) are linear regressions and (5) are linear regressions and the dependent variable is the number of points Player C 
assigned to Player A; (4) is a probit regression and the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if Player C rewarded A for a 
transfer t and 0 otherwise; in (5) the dependent variable is truncated at zero; all regressions include individual random 
effects; observations from three individuals are dropped in regression (5) as they were outliers, however, adding them in the 





Table A1  
Treatment  Punishment  Reward 
  P  PR Both R PR  Both
0-transfer 10.45***  5.63***  10.45***       
 (1.04)  (1.11)  (1.08)     
10-transfer 7.92***  4.43***  7.92***  0.44 0.12 0.44 
  (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.83) 
20-transfer 5.86***  3.37***  5.86***  1.07 0.02 1.07 
  (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.83) 
30-transfer 3.84***  1.94**  3.84***  1.74*  0.94  1.74* 
  (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.83) 
40-transfer  2.53** 2.29** 2.53** 2.39**  0.59  2.39** 
  (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.83) 
50-transfer 1.43 0.45 1.43 4.17*** 1.88 4.17*** 
  (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.83) 
60-transfer 0.67 0.33 0.67  5.11*** 2.29* 5.11*** 
  (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.83) 
70-transfer  0.49  1.14  0.49  7.02*** 3.31** 7.02*** 
  (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.83) 
80-transfer 0.23 0.20 0.23 7.96***  5.35***  7.96*** 
  (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.83) 
90-transfer -0.11 0.00 -0.11  9.02***  6.57***  9.02*** 
  (1.04) (1.11) (1.08) (1.03) (1.27) (1.83) 
100-transfer      10.70***  7.14***  10.70*** 
      (1.03)  (1.27)  (1.83) 
PR     -0.11     0.81 
     (1.31)     (1.79) 
PR*0-transfer     -4.82***     
     (1.53)     
PR*10-transfer     -3.49**     -0.31 
     (1.53)     (1.65) 
PR*20-transfer   -2.49   -1.05
     (1.53)     (1.65) 
PR*30-transfer     -1.90     -0.80 
   (1.53)   (1.65)
PR*40-transfer     -0.25     -1.80 
     (1.53)     (1.65) 
PR*50-transfer   -0.98   -2.30
     (1.53)     (1.65) 
PR*60-transfer     -0.35     -2.82* 
   (1.53)   (1.65)
PR*70-transfer     0.65     -3.72** 
     (1.53)     (1.65) 
PR*80-transfer   -0.02   -2.61
g
     (1.53)     (1.65) 
PR*90-transfer     0.10     -2.45
g 
     (1.53)     (1.65) 
PR*100-transfer        -3.55** 
        ( 1 . 6 5 )  
Constant  0.10 0.00 0.10 0.44 1.25 0.44 
  (0.93) (0.93) (0.93) (1.14) (1.37) (1.29) 
Observations  539 539  1078  506 539  1045 
Individuals  49 49 98 46 49 95 
Coefficient estimates are the income reduction Player C caused to Player A at that transfer level relative to the 
baseline transfer of 100 ECUs for punishment and baseline transfer of 0 ECUs for reward. Standard errors 
clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant 
at 1% level, 
g Note that these coefficients are marginally insignificant with p-value = 0.12 for both.  
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Figure A1 – The Demand for Costly Punishment by Individual 
 
Figure A2 - The Demand for Costly Reward by Individual  
 
The first digit in each subfigure indicates the treatment in which the individual participated (1= Treatment P; 2= Treatment PR; 3=Treatment 
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Graphs by Treatment and ID  1 
Instructions
 
These are the instructions for treatment PR (first wave). The instructions for the other treatments 
were appropriately adjusted and will be available for download at http://www.economics.unimelb 
.edu.au/nnikiforakis/ 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this experiment. If you read the following instructions 
carefully, you might be able to earn a considerable amount of money. For this reason it is very 
important that you take your time to understand the instructions. In addition to your earnings 
from the experiment, you will also receive a show-up fee of $5. During the experiment it is 
forbidden to talk to the other participants. Non-compliance with this rule will lead to exclusion 
from the experiment and all payments.  
 
In this experiment there are three types of participants: type-A participants, type-B participants 
and type-C participants. Each participant will be matched with two other individuals who will not 
be of the same type. You will be a type-A participant. Therefore you will be randomly matched 
with a type-B participant and a type-C participant. The identities of the participants with whom 
you’ll be matched will never be revealed during or after the experiment. Likewise, the other 
participants will never learn the identity of the people with whom they are matched.  
Your earnings in the experiment depend on your decisions in the experiment as well as the 
decisions of the other individuals with whom you have been matched. During the experiment we 
will speak of ECUs (Experimental Currency Units), rather than Australian dollars. At the end of 
the experiment your earnings in ECUs will be converted at the following rate 
 
1 ECU = 35 Australian cents  
The experiment consists of two stages, which are described below. Note that each stage will only 
be entered once. That is, each participant will make each decision once. Therefore, you should 
take your time to make the decision which is right for you. 
The first stage 
At the beginning of the first stage, you will receive an endowment of 100 ECUs. The type-B 
participant will not receive an endowment and will therefore have 0 ECUs. Your task in the 
first stage is to decide whether or not you want to transfer part of your endowment to the 
type-B participant. In particular, you can transfer to the type-B participant between 0 and 100 
ECUs in increments of 10 ECUs. That is, you can transfer 0, 10, 20, …,100 ECUs to the type-B 









   2 
Examples: (i) Assume you transfer 60 ECUs to the type-B participant, your earnings after the 
first stage will be 100 – 60 = 40 ECUs and the earnings of the type-B participant will be 60 
ECUs. (ii) If you transfer 10 ECUs to the type-B participant, your earnings after the first stage 
will be 90 ECUs and the earnings of the type-B participant will be 10 ECUs. (iii) If you transfer 0 
ECUs to the type-B participant, your earnings after the first stage will be 100 ECUs and the 
earnings of the type-B participant will be 0 ECUs. Type-B participants have no decision to make 
in either the first or the second stage.  
The second stage 
In the second stage the type-C participant receives an endowment and must decide whether 
to increase, decrease or leave unaffected your earnings. This decision may depend on how 
many ECUs you transferred to the type-B participant in the first stage. No one except the type-C 
participant will know his or her endowment. 
In order for the type-C participant to increase or decrease your earnings, he or she must purchase 
‘points’ and assign them to you. Every addition point that the type-C participant assigns to you 
increases your earnings by 2 ECUs, and costs them 1 ECU. Every subtraction point that the type-
C participant assigns to you reduces your earnings by 2 ECUs, and costs them 1 ECU.  
Examples: (i) Assume a type-C participant assigns 2 addition points to you. This will increase 
your earnings by 4 ECUs and reduce the earnings of the type-C participant by 2 ECUs. If a type-
C participant assigns 2 subtraction points to you, this will reduce your earnings by 4 ECUs and 
reduces the earnings of the type-C participant by 2 ECUs. (ii) If a type-C participant assigns 10 
addition points to you, it will increase your earnings by 20 ECUs, or if a type-C participant 
assigns 10 subtraction points to you, it will reduce your earnings by 20 ECUs and the earnings of 
the type-C participant will be reduced by 10 ECUs in both cases. (iii) If the type-C participant 
assigns 0 addition or subtraction points to you, your earnings and the earnings of the type-C 
participant will remain unaffected.  
After the type-C participant has made their decision you will be informed about his or her 
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In summary, the earnings of the type-A, B and C participants are computed as follows: 
(A) Earnings of a type-A participant = 
      Endowment of type-A participant (i.e. 100 ECUs) 
minus  The number of ECUs transferred to the type-B participant 
plus  2 ECUs for every addition point, which a type-C participant assigned to 
the type-A participant 
OR 
minus  2 ECUs for every subtraction point, which a type-C participant assigned to 
the type-A participant 
(B) Earnings of a type-B participant = Number of ECUs received from a type-A participant 
(C) Earnings of a type-C participant =  
   Endowment of Type-C participant  
minus 1 ECU for each addition or subtraction point assigned to Type-A participant 
  
Please note that your earnings can also be negative. In this case the ECUs will be taken from your 
show-up fee.  
If you don’t have any questions please answer the following questions. The questions are aimed 
to help you understand the experiment and how earnings are determined. When you have 
answered all the control questions, please notify an experimenter by raising your hand. The 
experiment will begin as soon as all participants have correctly answered the control questions. 
Control questionnaire  
 
1.  Consider the case that the type-A participant transfers 0 ECUs to the type-B participant 
and keeps 100 ECUs.  
a)  If the type-C participant assigns 0 points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
b)  If the type-C participant assigns 10 addition points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
c) If the type-C participant assigns 10 subtraction points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
2.  Consider the case that the type-A participant transfers 40 ECUs to the type-B 
participant and keeps 60 ECUs.  
a)  If the type-C participant assigns 0 points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
b) If the type-C participant assigns 10 addition points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
c)  If the type-C participant assigns 10 subtraction points to the type-A participant. 
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
If you have any questions please notify an experimenter by raising your hand.  1   
Instructions
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this experiment. If you read the following instructions 
carefully, you might be able to earn a considerable amount of money. For this reason it is very 
important that you take your time to understand the instructions. In addition to your earnings 
from the experiment, you will also receive a show-up fee of $5. During the experiment it is 
forbidden to talk to the other participants.  Non-compliance with this rule will lead to 
exclusion from the experiment and all payments.  
 
In this experiment there are three types of participants: type-A participants, type-B 
participants and type-C participants. Each participant will be matched with two other 
individuals who will not be of the same type. You will be a type-B participant. Therefore 
you will be randomly matched with a type-A participant and a type-C participant. The 
identities of the participants with whom you’ll be matched will never be revealed during or 
after the experiment. Likewise, the other participants will never learn the identity of the 
people with whom they are matched.  
Your earnings in the experiment depend on your decisions in the experiment as well as the 
decisions of the other individuals with whom you have been matched. During the experiment 
we will speak of ECUs (Experimental Currency Units), rather than Australian dollars. At the 
end of the experiment your earnings in ECUs will be converted at the following rate 
 
1 ECU = 35 Australian cents  
The experiment consists of two stages, which are described below. Note that each stage will 
only be entered once. That is, each participant will make each decision once. Therefore, you 
should take your time to make the decision which is right for you. 
The first stage 
At the beginning of the first stage, you will not receive an endowment and will therefore have 
0 ECUs. The type-A participant will receive an endowment of 100 ECUs. You do not have a 
task in the first stage.  
The task of the type-A participant in the first stage is to decide whether or not they want to 
transfer part of their endowment to you. The type-A participant can transfer you between 0 
and 100 ECUs in increments of 10 ECUs. That is, the type-A participant can transfer 0, 10, 
20, …,100 ECUs to you.  
Examples: (i) Assume the type-A participant transfers you 60 ECUs, your earnings after the 
first stage will be 60 ECUs and the earnings of the type-A participant will be 100 – 60 = 40 
ECUs. (ii) If the type-A participant transfers you 10 ECUs, your earnings after the first stage 
will be 10 ECUs and the earnings of the type-A participant will be 90 ECUs. (iii) If the type-
A participant transfers you 0 ECUs, your earnings after the first stage will be 0 ECUs and the 
earnings of the type-A participant will be 100 ECUs.  
The second stage 
In the second stage the type-C participant receives an endowment and must decide 
whether to increase, decrease or leave unaffected the type-A participant’s earnings. This 
decision may depend on how many ECUs the type-A participant transferred to you in the first 
stage. No one except the type-C participant will know his or her endowment. 
In order for the type-C participant to increase or decrease the type-A participant’s earnings, he 
or she must purchase ‘points’ and assign them to the type-A participant. Every addition point   2 
that the type-C participant assigns to the type-A participant increases the type-A participant’s 
earnings by 2 ECUs, and costs them 1 ECU. Every subtraction  point that the type-C 
participant assigns to the type-A participant reduces the type-A participant’s earnings by 2 
ECUs, and costs them 1 ECU.  
Examples: (i) Assume a type-C participant assigns 2 addition  points to the type-A 
participant. This will increase the type-A participant’s earnings by 4 ECUs and reduce the 
earnings of the type-C participant by 2 ECUs. If a type-C participant assigns 2 subtraction 
points to the type-A participant, this will reduce the type-A participant’s earnings by 4 ECUs 
and the earnings of the type-C participant by 2 ECUs. (ii) If a type-C participant assigns 10 
addition points to the type-A participant, it will increase the type-A participant’s earnings by 
20 ECUs, or if a type-C participant assigns 10 subtraction points to the type-A participant, it 
will reduce the type-A participant’s earnings by 20 ECUs and the earnings of the type-C 
participant will be reduced by 10 ECUs in both cases. (iii) If the type-C participant assigns 0 
addition or subtraction points to the type-A participant, the type-A participant’s earnings and 
the earnings of the type-C participant will remain unaffected. After the type-C participant has 
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In summary, the earnings of the type-A, B and C participants are computed as follows: 
(A) Earnings of a type-A participant = 
      Endowment of type-A participant (i.e. 100 ECUs) 
minus  The number of ECUs transferred to the type-B participant 
plus  2 ECUs for every addition point, which a type-C participant assigned to 
the type-A participant 
OR 
minus  2 ECUs for every subtraction point, which a type-C participant 
assigned to the type-A participant 
(B) Earnings of a type-B participant = Number of ECUs received from a type-A participant 
(C) Earnings of a type-C participant =  
   Endowment of Type-C participant  
minus   1 ECU for each addition or subtraction point assigned to Type-A 
participant 
   
If you don’t have any questions please answer the following questions. The questions are 
aimed to help you understand the experiment and how earnings are determined. When you 
have answered all the control questions, please notify an experimenter by raising your hand. 
The experiment will begin as soon as all participants have correctly answered the control 
questions. 
Control questionnaire  
 
1.  Consider the case that the type-A participant transfers 0 ECUs to the type-B 
participant and keeps 100 ECUs.  
a)  If the type-C participant assigns 0 points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
b)  If the type-C participant assigns 10 addition points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
c) If the type-C participant assigns 10 subtraction points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
2.  Consider the case that the type-A participant transfers 40 ECUs to the type-B 
participant and keeps 60 ECUs.  
a)  If the type-C participant assigns 0 points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
b) If the type-C participant assigns 10 addition points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
c)  If the type-C participant assigns 10 subtraction points to the type-A participant. 
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
If you have any questions please notify an experimenter by raising your hand.   1 
Instructions
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this experiment. If you read the following instructions 
carefully, you might be able to earn a considerable amount of money. For this reason it is very 
important that you take your time to understand the instructions. In addition to your earnings 
from the experiment, you will also receive a show-up fee of $5. During the experiment it is 
forbidden to talk to the other participants.  Non-compliance with this rule will lead to 
exclusion from the experiment and all payments.  
 
In this experiment there are three types of participants: type-A participants, type-B 
participants and type-C participants. Each participant will be matched with two other 
individuals who will not be of the same type. You will be a type-C participant. Therefore 
you will be randomly matched with a type-A participant and a type-B participant. The 
identities of the participants with whom you’ll be matched will never be revealed during or 
after the experiment. Likewise, the other participants will never learn the identity of the 
people with whom they are matched.  
Your earnings in the experiment depend on your decisions in the experiment as well as the 
decisions of the other individuals with whom you have been matched. During the experiment 
we will speak of ECUs (Experimental Currency Units), rather than Australian dollars. At the 
end of the experiment your earnings in ECUs will be converted at the following rate 
 
1 ECU = 35 Australian cents  
The experiment consists of two stages, which are described below. Note that each stage will 
only be entered once. That is, each participant will make each decision once. Therefore, you 
should take your time to make the decision which is right for you. 
The first stage 
At the beginning of the first stage, the type-A participant receives an endowment of 100 
ECUs. The type-B participant does not receive an endowment and therefore has 0 ECUs. 
Only the type-A participant makes a decision at the first stage. The task of the type-A 
participant in the first stage is to decide whether or not they want to transfer part of 
their endowment to the type-B participant. The type-A participant can transfer the type-B 
participant between 0 and 100 ECUs in increments of 10 ECUs. That is, the type-A 
participant can transfer 0, 10, 20, …,100 ECUs to the type-B participant. Only the type-A 
participant makes a decision at the first stage. 
Examples: (i) Assume the type-A participant transfers 60 ECUs to the type-B participant, the 
type-A participant’s earnings after the first stage will be 100 – 60 = 40 ECUs and the earnings 
of the type-B participant will be 60 ECUs. (ii) If the type-A participant transfers 10 ECUs to 
the type-B participant, the type-A participant’s earnings after the first stage will be 90 ECUs 
and the earnings of the type-B participant will be 10 ECUs. (iii) If the type-A participant 
transfers 0 ECUs to the type-B participant, the type-A participant’s earnings after the first 
stage will be 100 ECUs and the earnings of the type-B participant will be 0 ECUs. Type-B 
participants have no decision to make in either the first or the second stage.  
The second stage 
Your task in the second stage is to decide whether you want to increase, decrease or 
leave unaffected the earnings of the type-A participant. If you wish to increase the 
earnings of the type-A participant you must purchase addition points, or if you want to 
decrease the earnings of the type-A participant you must purchase subtraction points. Every  
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addition point that you assign to the type-A participant increases the type-A participant’s 
earnings by 2 ECUs, and costs you 1 ECU. Every subtraction point that you assign to the 
type-A participant reduces the type-A participant’s earnings by 2 ECUs, and costs you 1 
ECU.  
At the beginning of the second stage, you will receive an endowment of 65 ECUs. Therefore 
you can assign between 0 and 65 points to the type-A participant. Note that, neither the type-
A participant nor the type-B participant will know your endowment. They only know their 
endowments and that you can assign points to the type-A participant, but not the number of 
points that you can assign to him/her.  
Examples: (i) Assume you assign 2 addition points to the type-A participant, it will increase 
the type-A participant’s earnings by 4 ECUs and reduce your earnings by 2 ECUs. If you 
assign 2 subtraction points to the type-A participant, it will reduce the type-A participant’s 
earnings by 4 ECUs and your earnings by 2 ECUs. (ii) If you assign 10 addition points to the 
type-A participant, it will increase the type-A participant’s earnings by 20 ECUs, or if you 
assign 10 subtraction points to the type-A participant, it will reduce the type-A participant’s 
earnings by 20 ECUs and your earnings are reduced by 10 ECUs in both cases. (iii) If you 
assign 0 addition or subtraction points to the type-A participant, the type-A participant’s 
earnings and your earnings will remain unaffected.  
Note that you will have to make your decision about how many points (if any) to assign to the 
type-A participant before you find out his/her decision. To make your decision you must use a 
screen as shown below. On the screen you must indicate how many addition or subtraction 
points you will assign to the type-A participant (if any) in the case he or she gives the type-B 
participant 0 ECUs, in the case he or she gives the type-B participant 10 ECUs, in the case he 
or she gives the type-B participant 20 ECUs, etc. This means that you will make your decision 
for each possible transfer level of the type-A participant. You cannot assign both addition and 
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Consider the following example which explains how to make your decision using the decision 
screen seen above on the previous page. Assume you wish to assign X subtraction points in 
the case the type-A participant gives the type-B participant 0 ECUs. Then you should enter 
the number ‘X’ in the column of subtraction points for the transfer level labelled ‘0 ECU’ 
under the heading “If Participant A transfers Participant B:” and you must enter the number 
‘0’ in the addition points box for that transfer level. If you then wish to assign Y addition 
points in the case the type-A participant gives the type-B participant 10 ECUs, you should 
enter the number ‘Y’ in the addition points box on the next row labelled “10 ECU”, and you 
must enter ‘0’ in the subtraction points box for that transfer level.  If you then wish to assign 
no  subtraction or addition points for the case the type-A participant gives the type-B 
participant 20 ECUs, you should enter the number ‘0’ into both the addition points box and 
the subtraction points box for that transfer level. You must enter a number into each box for 
each transfer level on the screen.   
 
Given that you will not know how many ECUs the type-A participant has transferred to the 
type-B participant, any of the 11 decisions might be used to determine your final payoff and 
the payoff of the type-A participant. Which of your decisions is actually realised depends on 
the actual transfer of ECUs from the type-A participant. For example, if the type-A 
participant has transferred 30 ECUs to the type-B participant, your earnings and that of the 
type-A participant will be determined by the decision which you have made in this case. 
After you have made your decisions, you will be informed of the conclusion of the 
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In summary, the earnings of the type-A, B and C participants are computed as follows: 
(A) Earnings of a type-A participant = Endowment of type-A participant (i.e. 100 ECUs) 
minus  The number of ECUs transferred to the type-B participant 
plus  2 ECUs for every addition point, which a type-C participant assigned to 
the type-A participant 
OR 
minus  2 ECUs for every subtraction point, which a type-C participant 
assigned to the type-A participant 
(B) Earnings of a type-B participant = Number of ECUs received from a type-A participant 
(C) Earnings of a type-C participant =  
   Endowment of Type-C participant (i.e. 65 ECUs) 
minus 1 ECU for each addition or subtraction point assigned to Type-A 
participant 
 
If you don’t have any questions please answer the following questions. The questions are 
aimed to help you understand the experiment and how earnings are determined. When you 
have answered all the control questions, please notify an experimenter by raising your hand. 
The experiment will begin as soon as all participants have correctly answered the control 
questions. 
 
Control questionnaire  
 
1.   Consider the case that the type-A participant transfers 0 ECUs to the type-B 
participant and keeps 100 ECUs.  
a)  If the type-C participant assigns 0 points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-C participant?  .......... 
b)  If the type-C participant assigns 10 addition points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-C participant?  .......... 
c) If the type-C participant assigns 10 subtraction points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-C participant?  .......... 
 
2.   Consider the case that the type-A participant transfers 40 ECUs to the type-B 
participant and keeps 60 ECUs.  
a)  If the type-C participant assigns 0 points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-C participant?  .......... 
b) If the type-C participant assigns 10 addition points to the type-A participant.  
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  ..........  
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What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-C participant?  .......... 
c)  If the type-C participant assigns 10 subtraction points to the type-A participant. 
What are the earnings of the type-A participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-B participant?  .......... 
What are the earnings of the type-C participant?  .......... 
If you have any questions please notify an experimenter by raising your hand.   
 
                         
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 